Introduction

The Harari are a recently formed Diaspora of Muslim elites from the walled city of Harar in eastern Ethiopia. Ethiopians as a whole have not had a history of migration-of moving abroad permanently or changing their citizenship (Catholic Immigration Centre 1). The Harari have been particularly localized and were described as late as the mid-1960s as a "one city culture" (Waldron, "Social" 6) because the overwhelming majority of their numbers resided inside the old city wall. Today, only about one-third of the total population lives in the old city, the majority of them elder inhabitants. The largest concentration of Hararis outside Ethiopia is now in Toronto, Ontario: nearly 10% of the entire population lives in this diverse Canadian city. In this paper, I draw upon comparative ethnographic fieldwork with Hararis in Harar and Toronto to explore the ways in which this move from Ethiopia, as asylum seekers or as immigrants to Canada, has affected individual and group identities. Against the backdrop of Ethiopia's new multi ethnic government, Canadian multiculturalism policies, and the refugee and immigrant journeys between the two countries, Hararis and members of more than the seventy other officially recognized *qabila,* [2] or nationalities, in Ethiopia[3] are struggling to redefine themselves both at home and abroad.

"Harariness," like other Ethiopian ethnic identities, draws variously upon linguistic, cultural, religious, political, and economic sources as well as on geographic and historical continuities and perceptions. Given their recent dispersal, Hararis are forced to construct an identity that is meaningful in transnational terms, in order both to ensure continuity of the group over time and spatial distance and to recreate community ideals and relationships in such a way that they are simultaneously relevant in new environments and responsive to changes taking place at home. Ethiopia's ethnic federalism, outlined briefly below, privileges particular ethnic identities or sub-nationalisms over national or religious identities, while Canada's official policy of multiculturalism asserts the primacy of nationalisms over sub-nationalisms or religions in determining identities. Many Harari in diasporic contexts have, however, turned to Islam as an ideological framework through which to cope with the upheaval of recent decades and to establish new relations in the non-Muslim countries in which they have resettled, asserting the primacy of religious identity over ethnic or national identities.

Ethiopian Government and the Making of Refugees

Since the overthrow of Mengistu Haile Mariam, the leader of the socialist dictatorship known as the Dergue,[4] in 1991, Ethiopia has adopted a democratic constitution that guarantees basic human rights, including the right to freedom of expression in ethno cultural and religious terms. The new government elected in 1995 proposed to restructure the country along ethnic lines, dividing the country into nine ethnic regions,[5] the smallest of which is the city-state of Harar, which were granted the right to self-determination, up to and including the right to secession. It was on the basis of this secession law that Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993, after thirty years of protracted struggle, though disputes over borders between Eritrea and the northern province of Tigray continue to this day.

In an attempt to unify and bring under central control the disparate peoples of the Ethiopian region at the end of the last century, Amharic, the language of the Amhara (an ethnic designation of Christian

highlanders who have dominated the region and the church since the thirteenth century), was adopted as the national language and Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity as the religion of the Imperial state. For non-Amhara, Amharic became the prestige language of education and political power, and many non-Amhara assimilated into this largely class-determined category because of the privileges associated with membership and allegiance.

Under the rule of the last emperor, Haile Selassie (1930-1974), Christianity was privileged over Islam despite the fact that nearly 60% of the country was Muslim. While Christianity and Amharic were promoted as the religion and language of the Imperial state, the military dictatorship that seized power from Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974 went further, demanding and enforcing linguistic, religious, and cultural conversion, meting out brutal and oppressive measures designed to suppress the expression of ethnic difference.[6] The Dergue's socialism demanded conformity in ethno cultural terms; the reality of Amhara dominance over other ethnic groups [7] in the country was masked by nationalist rhetoric, and opposition was undermined through various economic and political strategies.

Thousands of Ethiopians, including a great many Amhara, sought asylum during this era (1974-1991). Young men were generally the first to flee, as they were the section of the population most at risk of being conscripted to serve in the Dergue's army and most involved in rising opposition parties. Different parts of the country were variously affected by war, war-related famine, forced resettlement, and economic ruin through the abolition of private ownership, while particular classes and ethnic groups were targeted as harboring dissidents and objectors. Violence became increasingly widespread and indiscriminate, producing a "reign of terror" during which the Dergue committed gross human rights violations.[8]

Many who fled during the Dergue regime sought asylum from persecution on the basis of their ethnicity. In their countries of exile, however, they have been identified on the basis of national origin, a designation that is often anathema to self and group identifications.[9] Furthermore, in the Diaspora, religion has, for many Muslim Ethiopians, become the most meaningful point of reference for individual and collective identities. This has certainly been the case among the Harari, who are exclusively Muslim and have been since the introduction of Islam into the Harari region by Arab missionaries in the ninth century. Through upheaval and resettlement in Canada, however, what it is to be Muslim has been reoriented from a culturally specific understanding revolving around highly localized practices to a more homogenized, globalized tradition of standardized practices reinforced by other Muslims in Canada. In adopting global traditions, many Hararis, particularly men in their late twenties and thirties, have told me they have in fact become "more Muslim" since being in Canada. This process has resulted in the disarticulation of the religio-political and ethno cultural features upon which Harari identity has traditionally been based, and consequently oriented Hararis toward other Muslims in Canada rather than toward members of other Ethiopian groups.

This development can be understood in the context of Ethiopian history, which has been dominated by political and economic tensions largely expressed in terms of religious opposition between Christians and Muslims. The historic development of Ethiopia as a Christian state and of Ethiopianness as a Christian and, in particular, Christian Amhara identity has excluded Muslims in particular.

What is Ethiopia and Who are the Ethiopians ?

At the end of the last century, an army of Christian Amhara, under King Menelik consolidated what were once a series of disparate and independent kingdoms and states in the Ethiopian region. One of the most important of these campaigns was the annexation of the independent kingdom of Harar. The Harari Emirate, an ethnic aristocracy that at times engaged in and promoted strategic inter-ethnic marriages with locally resident Oromo and Somali, independently governed and administered a flourishing center of trade

and Islamic scholarship between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries.[l0] In 1887, the city was invaded and annexed as a critical move in the territorial expansion of the Christian Empire that was to become Ethiopia. With the abolition of the Emirate, the independence of Harar was relinquished, never to be fully reinstated (Hassen, Oromo 232).

Most historical work on Ethiopia has focused on the regions' rulers, referring to the kingdoms and Royal Chronicles of the Christian highlanders (James xiii); "conventional" history tends to start with the alliance of the allegedly Ethiopian Queen of Sheba and King Solomon, the King of Israel, in the tenth century. BC (Zewde 7)[11] The offspring of this union was the founder of the Solomonic dynasty of Amharas, through whom the emperors of Ethiopia up to Haile Selassie traced their descent.

Little historiography information is available for the period prior to the rise of the Solomonic dynasty. From the first through seventh centuries AD, the dominant kingdom in the region was the Kingdom of Aksum in the province of Tigray. Aksum is now referred to as the first capital of Ethiopia. The Tigrayans, who claim to be the descendants of the Aksumites, the original rulers of Ethiopia, have been engaged in ongoing conflict of varying intensity with the Amharas since the latter seized power in 1270. The Tigrayans finally succeeded in overthrowing the Amharas in 1991, when the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and its allies, who collectively formed the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), toppled the Mengistu regime.

Both the Tigrayans and the Amharas are Orthodox Christians. In 330 AD, the Aksumite King Ezana was converted to Christianity, and from this point on, as Zewde states, "the creed, in orthodox form, came to express the cultural identity of a large section of the highland population" (8). In 1150, the Aksumite kings were overthrown by the Zagwe dynasty of the Agaw-speaking peoples, whom the Aksumites had Christianized and who are best known for their construction of monolithic churches at now famous tourist destinations such as Lalibela. The Zagwe, in turn, were overtaken by another dynasty based in the Amhara province - the Amharas, who claimed descent from King Solomon. Through the Amharas, Christianity spread further south, north, and northwest.

Ethiopians tend to refer to these Christian peoples of the ancient provinces collectively as Abyssinian (Markakis 14). From the thirteenth century, Abyssinian clergy began to record chronicles of the Solomonic dynasty. For the first three centuries, these records are dominated by accounts of conflict with hostile Muslim forces in the southeast. Islam was brought into the region by Muslim merchants and missionaries from Arabia beginning in the ninth century. As Islam spread over the Red Sea coast and into the lowlands, the Aksumites were forced to halt their campaign and retreat into the highlands (Markakis 13). By the fourteenth century, Islam had given rise to a series of sultanates and principalities stretching from the east into the lowlands of the southern central interior (Donham 21) and posed a serious threat to the further spread of Christianity in the contest to convert pagan peoples.

Muslim peoples dominated Red Sea trade and effectively controlled the vital trade route between the port of Zeila on the Gulf of Aden and the southern interior of the Ethiopian region. Donham states that "the very word for merchant, *negade*, was synonymous with Islam - that which was outside, in opposition to Abyssinian society" (34). Intense rivalry between Christians and Muslims in the Horn of Africa was largely motivated by the quest to secure control over the lucrative caravan routes carrying slaves, ivory, coffee, and other goods from the interior of Sudan and Ethiopia to the Red Sea Coast and on to Arabia (Hassen, "Menelik" 22). For centuries, Harar lay at heart of this expansive Muslim trading network, and the city developed into a thriving commercial center (Ahmed 33; Hassen, "Menelik" 228-9) where goods and services from different regions and groups in Ethiopia were exchanged under the strict regulation of the Harari Emirate.

Under thriving economic conditions in the sixteenth century, Harar's most notorious Emir, Ahmed Ibn Ibrahim al Ghazi, or Gragn ("the left-handed"), as he is popularly known, waged jihad against the Christian kingdom. Markakis writes that the force of this attack was fueled by "religious fanaticism [that] rendered the conflict exceedingly ruthless and brought devastation to the Christian population, as well as mass conversion to Islam by force" (15). For fifteen years, the very survival of the Christian state was seriously threatened (Hassen, "Menelik"; see also Donham 47).

While Gragn was ultimately killed, Christians and Muslims continued to be locked in conflict, and intense struggle between specific ethno-religious groups and Christian nationalists dominated Ethiopian politics throughout the Imperial rule of the Amharas and the Amhara-based socialist dictatorship that succeeded it. Ethiopianness, as expressed in Menelik's campaign, was based on the idea of the acceptance of Christianity (Kinfe 157). Imperial Ethiopia was defined by Haile Selassie as a Christian state; government propaganda asserted that Ethiopia was a Christian island in a Muslim sea (155), and this idea was used to elicit support from the United States against the "Muslim threat." This stance manifested itself in the form, among other things, of Ethiopian support for Israel. Kinfe reports that under Haile Selassie the number of Muslims in the country was systematically underestimated in official censuses, and the government attempted to undermine Islamic influence within the country by prohibiting the teaching of Arabic in state schools and by excluding Muslims from the ruling classes, except where they were able to prove that their primary allegiance was to the Imperial state (155-7). Kinfe surmises that Muslims in Ethiopia today generally feel they have been persecuted for their beliefs and dominated by Christian rulers, while Christians feel bitter about the expansion of Islam into formerly Christian territories (154).

The Ethiopian Diaspora

Since 1991, ethnic politics have been at the forefront of the new "democratic" constitution. Given their historic persecution, Muslim populations in Ethiopia have generally supported Eritrea's decision to exercise regional rights to self-determination to the point of secession (Kinfe), while Christian populations, particularly the Amhara, have seen this move as a step toward the balkanization· and dissolution of Amhara-defined Ethiopia.

Where debate between Ethiopian groups in Diaspora occurs, it centers around this issue, and historical antagonisms are largely recreated in the diasporic contexts in which Ethiopians are now establishing communities. In the Diaspora, however, members of different ethnic groups are no longer directly subject to the oppression created by ethnically determined hierarchies in Ethiopia, which have in particular excluded and marginalized Muslims from national politics. Members of different ethnic groups are thus recreating communities under a new set of national and transnational pressures and establishing different alliances with members of other groups largely on the basis of shared interests. As a result, among the 15,000 to 20,000 Christian and Muslim Ethiopians in Canada,[12] members of various ethnic groups establish very different relationships both to the dominant society and to other marginalized groups within it, suggesting that had they been free to develop without the pressure to participate in a shared Ethiopian nationalism, their self-determination might well have taken them in markedly different directions. There is little dialogue among Ethiopian groups in Canada, and little overlap between community organizations, because the majority of these are ethnically based.[13] Among Muslim groups like the Harari, the principal ties individuals establish outside the community are to other Muslims. For many individuals, religious identity has developed greater significance here; they identify first and foremost as Muslim, rather than as Ethiopian or Harari. The distant relationships between Ethiopian groups in Canada are not, then, only the result of the recreation of historic antagonisms in the Diaspora, but a consequence of changes in, among other things, Ethiopian Muslim identity brought about through the development of broader, less culturally specific religious ties within diasporic contexts. [14]

The Harari Diaspora

The Catholic Immigration Centre in Ottawa reports that nearly two-thirds of Ethiopian newcomers to Canada are single; the majority of these are under the age of thirty (1). As was the case with members of other Ethiopian ethnic groups, the first Hararis to arrive were young men. The majority of these young men came alone, though some fled taking younger siblings with them; in a limited number of cases, entire families escaped together. The majority of those early Hararis who left traveled on foot to camps in Somalia and Djibouti, while some of the more affluent made the Haj, or pilgrimage to Mecca, and simply did not return. Securing their UN Convention Refugee Status documents in neighboring eastern African countries and the Gulf States, most of those who came to live in Canada and the United States were accepted first in Italy and Germany, where they lived anywhere from one to seven years.

Those who came alone, or with younger siblings, tend to reflect upon their early experiences as lonely and isolating. When they came to Canada, they found very few points of familiar reference. Mosque's and Muslim organizations like the Islamic Charitable Organization stood as the most obviously visible reflection of Harari experience in the Canadian landscape. Much of the cultural tradition these earliest arrivals carried with them could not be similarly reinforced in the Canadian context, and cultural traditions would have been particularly hard to maintain in the absence of community elders, from whom these traditions are learned. Islam offered a sense of community before there was really a community in Diaspora, so to speak.

The majority of Hararis arrived in Canada between 1986 and 1991. In 1986 there were approximately sixty Hararis in Canada, all of them in Toronto; now, community leaders estimate that the population in Canada numbers somewhere in the order of 3,000 to 4,000, the majority still living in Toronto.[15] Once the first Hararis came to North America, they began to sponsor their family members. As a 1991 report on ethnicity in Toronto concluded, "when an immigrant community is established in a certain city or region, other immigrants follow because of the presence of family and friends. Others also follow because of the established ethnic and socio-cultural infrastructure" (Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto).

With the change in government in Ethiopia in 1991, it has become considerably harder for Ethiopians to gain admission to Canada. Still, many youth in Harar aspire to come to Toronto. While those who fled during the Mengistu era did so primarily as political asylum seekers, the establishment of communities abroad now appeals to many who were less directly threatened by the Dergue and presents an option to those who live in the post-Dergue era and wish to migrate to better their educational and economic prospects or to be reunited with family. Migration is now considered a viable and desirable option for the younger generation of a population who historically did not generally consider such a possibility beyond the seasonal migration to Saudi Arabia during the month of the Haj.

Helene Moussa notes that, unlike other Ethiopian populations who are relatively scattered throughout the city, the Harari are residentially clustered, with the majority residing in high-rise buildings in the former municipality of Scarborough, now part of the City of Toronto (209). This is less the case today, which suggests that their initial residential clustering reflected not necessarily closer community ties or greater insularity, but, rather, their relatively recent arrival in Canada. While the original neighborhoods still attract new Harari arrivals, as the community has grown in number and Harari have established themselves here, they have made connections outside the community and have moved out of the original neighborhoods in which they were concentrated. The community center and the Qur'anic school are both located in Scarborough, but Hararis are now scattered across the city, although primarily resident in its less expensive suburbs. In the last couple of years, communities have begun to develop in other cities such as Edmonton, Vancouver, and Montreal, as Hararis have begun to migrate internally in search of better economic opportunities.

Identification in the Multicultural Context of Canada Toronto is the largest and most ethnically diverse city in the country, and since 1986 it has taken in about one-third (or 70,0000-80,000) of all immigrants and refugees who have come to Canada each year (Advisory Committee on Immigrant and Refugee Issues of Toronto 21). At the 1998 Forum on the Impact of Immigration and Refugee Settlement in Toronto, it was proclaimed that "no city in the world has a higher proportion of its population who are foreign-born than Toronto" (21). The report claims that there are "about a. hundred different racial or ethnic groups living in Metropolitan Toronto" (21), but what these are and how they are defined remain unspecified.

Because Canadian census and population statistics differentiate on the basis of national origin, it is difficult to develop any official estimates of the Harari, or of any other ethnic group from Ethiopia, in Canada. To the government, Ethiopians are Ethiopians rather than Oromo, Tigrayan, Amhara, Harari, or one of the more than seventy other officially recognized ethnic groups or "nationalities" in Ethiopia. The politics and specifics of identity, recognition, and representation, however, have particular salience in a world of pluralist polities (Dusenberry 738), where populations are deterritorialized (Deleuze and Guattari), diasporic and transnational (Appadurai). For Canadian officialdom, the Harari are Ethiopian. The designation of Hararis as Ethiopian contrasts with their perception of themselves in ethnic terms. Sorenson notes that while individuals from Ethiopia are classified as Ethiopian regardless of their ethnic origin or self-identification, among themselves they actively assert their group distinctiveness ("Politics" 71). The fixity of the official categorization fails, furthermore, to account for shifts in identification such as the Harari assertion of religious determination, which has taken place in response to being forced to flee countries of origin, negotiate refugee passage, and establish community in diasporic contexts.

Under the Trudeau government, a specific policy of multiculturalism was put into place in the 1970s. In recent years, Canada has, as Dusenberry notes, "pushed an aggressive multiculturalism ... agenda in the face of insecurities about its national unity (738-9). Canada's Multiculturalism Act of 1988 (Government of Canada, "Canadian") finds its origins in the Multiculturalism Policy of October 1971, in which it is asserted that "cultural pluralism is the very essence of Canadian identity" ("Announcement" 1850). This policy officially recognizes that "every ethnic group has the right to preserve and develop its own culture within the Canadian context" (8581).

As Dusenberry points out, the original policy documents rejected "origin" or "mother tongue" and specified instead the rather vague and poetic notions of a "sense of belonging to the group" and "the groups' 'collective will to exist'" as the basis of "adherence to [an] ethnic group" (Government of Canada, "Announcement" 8545). In practice, however, the basis upon which ethnic groups are identified within the Canadian mosaic is "national origin" (Dusenberry 742). Sikhs in Canada, for example, are thus classified as Indians, despite their personal and often vociferous rejection of this association and their desire for recognition as an ethno cultural group of separate national origins (742). Similarly, Eritreans, prior to the secession of their territory from Ethiopia in 1993, were classified as Ethiopians in Canada, despite the fact that it was precisely this association - the annexation of Eritrea by Ethiopia and the thirty year war that resulted - that served as the basis for Eritreans seeking and being granted political asylum in Canada. The Eritrean case is perhaps the strongest illustration of this point,[16] but many members of various other "nationalities" from Ethiopia similarly reject this association.

Identification in the Ethnic Federation of Ethiopia

While the Harari are a little-known population outside Ethiopia [17] within the country they have been granted special dispensation, as descendants of the historic rulers and inhabitants of an independent Muslim city-state, to restore self-government in the region over which they formerly exercised control.

Although Harar is the smallest of the country's nine new autonomous ethnic regions, the Harari population is perhaps better represented proportionately than any other Ethiopian "nationality" at the federal level.

Today, however, the Harari constitute a numeric minority in the overall region. As Hararis left during the Mengistu era, Oromo in the surrounding countryside of the region have increasingly moved into its center, the congested space within the city walls that have traditionally demarcated the Harari homeland. Some of the Amhara settlers who were relocated to the Harari region during the Mengistu era have also taken up residence within the city walls. While the city has long housed some wealthier Oromo and Somali who have integrated themselves into Harari society to varying degrees, its population has, as a consequence of this recent out migration, become more heterogeneous, in terms of both ethnicity and class, than it has ever been.

The reasons for the endurance of Harari prestige are complex and multifaceted, but derive most directly from their relative affluence as a community, both at home and abroad, and from the high level of education and literacy found quite uniformly throughout the population. While the basis of their historic position of privilege and prestige as a land-owning elite was undermined by policies put into place during the Imperial and socialist regimes of this century, their relative affluence was largely sustained throughout the Dergue era by resources from the Harari Diaspora. The significant proportion of the population who sought exile abroad during this period sent back remittances to family in the city and sponsored relatives' to join them. The position of Hararis at "home" is thus determined by a complex interplay of local and global forces-transnational exchanges articulated by representatives across the Harari Diaspora. This has taken on new forms in the post-Dergue era, most visibly the repatriation of people: young men who have been educated in the West have been encouraged, and in some cases invited, home to govern the new regional administration; and Hararis are returning in search of investment opportunities in the new capitalist economy.

With the movement toward more essentialized Muslim identities in the Harari Diaspora, its representatives develop particular perspectives concerning religious practices in Harar and can be seen, in some cases, to be applying subtle pressure on their Harari brothers and sisters in Harar to realize and embrace a broader tradition of Islam. Hararis in Saudi Arabia, for instance, actively pushed the education bureau of the new local government in Harar to select the Arabic script for their development of a Harari alphabet. While the financial incentive offered by Saudi Hararis may have been enticing, the choice of the Arabic script did not make sense in practical and political terms for Hararis still resident in Ethiopia, and the Amharic script was ultimately adopted. [18] Harari administrators feared that choosing the Arabic script would ally the Harari too closely with Arab interests and distance them from the new central government. With the political gains Hararis were making under the new government, it was deemed foolish to place these good relations in jeopardy. It is also not insignificant that the largest and most successful fundraising campaigns among Hararis in Canada have surrounded establishing and supporting Qur'anic education for children, both here and in Harar. Hararis in Toronto recently paid the significant sum of $25 (Cdn) each for an evening of music and dance to raise funds for the now dilapidated Sheikh Abubeker Qur'anic School in Harar, and they have thus far been successful in raising approximately $5,000 for this project.

The City of Saints: Religion in Harar

As a historic center of Muslim trade and Islamic scholarship, Harar has developed under the influence of multiethnic African and Arabian sources. These multiple influences are reflected in local religious practices, which are a complex syncretic blend of traditions shared by local residents. While many Hararis in the Diaspora now question the degree to which many specific practices can be considered Islamic, this

local religious orthodoxy has provided an essential framework through which the socio-religious, political, and economic life of Harar has been organized for centuries. Despite years of suppression of Muslim influences, Islam continues to serve as a basis for the organization of people in and around Harar. With nearly a hundred mosques and over 300 saints' shrines contained within and just beyond the few square kilometers delimited by the city wall, Islam is observably reflected in the architecture and spatial organization of the place and its people (Gibb, "Religion").

While Muslims the world over share obedience to that which is *sunna,* or obligatory within Islam, local attitudes of course differ enormously according to historic and cultural contexts.[19] In Harar, the experience of Islam refers most directly to the saints (awliya', or wall in the singular) in whose honor shrines, referred to as awach, are scattered throughout the city. In the Qur'an, the term wali is variously used to denote a "friend," "patron," "benefactor," or "protector," of God,[20] and in some cases to describe God himself in relationship to humans.[21] In Harar, awliya' are understood in the first sense-as trusted friends and allies of God engaged with him in relations of mutual obligation and support, through whom God's blessing can be bestowed.

Awach is also the Harari term for "fathers," and shrines thus represent forefathers (and -mothers)[22] of the community. Thus the history and genealogy of the community is bound up in legends about the saints. Many of the saints are regarded as central figures in the history of the city-famous religious scholars, warriors, and kings who defended, waged holy war in defense of, and ruled over the city and the surrounding countryside. AB descendants of saints, Harari see their city and community protected by blessings transmitted by God through his intermediaries. This protection can only be sustained by constant and community-wide invocation through ritual, prayer, and *ziyara*, or visits to the shrine, where devotees come bearing offerings of incense, certain foods, and chat, the leaf chewed as a stimulant throughout the region.[23]

As I have discussed at some length elsewhere, while the saints are considered the forefathers and -mothers of the Harari, locally resident Oromo and Somali also locate their ancestors among this same corpus (Gibb, "Baraka"). The origins of local saints are variously traced to Arabia, Iraq, Yemen, and Turkey, and a large number of saints of Somali and Oromo origin are included as well. Heterogeneous populations refer collectively to the shrines as *awach*[24] and thus share aspects of a particularly local understanding of Islam.[25] The existence and significance of this phenomenon has been noted elsewhere. Referring to the Egyptian city of Tanta, Denny states that it is striking that "in a country that is' at once warmly hospitable to outsiders and fiercely devoted to its own kind, two of its greatest saints should have come from outside" (82). Where Denny considers the presence of saints of different origins to be a simple reflection of the "universalizing brotherhood of Islam" (82), however, I treat this phenomenon as a means through which foreign influences are integrated into local religious practices.

The historic literature suggests that the Harari are, in fact, multiethnic in origin, most likely the product of intermarriage between Arab immigrants and local residents (e.g., Bardey) and of strategic interethnic marital alliances (Hassen, "Menelik"). Centuries of common residence and religious worship have further served to minimize differences, or, more accurately, contributed to aspects of common culture shared between residents in Harar. Where class differences have been constructed and phrased in the language of ethnicity, adherence to a common local religious orthodoxy counters distance constructed in the socioeconomic realm. Difference between groups is primarily socioeconomic, but what is central to the religious life of the Harari is in fact shared across differences of ethnicity and class.

Local religious orthodoxy is flexible, absorbent, and heterogeneous and provides a framework through which "foreignness" is at once localized and "naturalized." Saints, as forefathers as well as community

leaders, are thus heterodox in origin, reflecting the reality of centuries of interethnic interaction and the multiethnic sources invested in this "ethnic" category.

(Re)constructing borders between groups who have shared both centuries of local religious orthodoxy and decades of common persecution as Muslims and non-Amharas is, as we might imagine, a painful and at times violent process. In Harar, this has involved disentangling associations through historical revision, which shifts emphasis from commonalities to differences and then hierarchizes and institutionalizes these differences, so that non-Harari have been virtually excluded from positions of authority in the new regional administration.

Where the local determination of Harari "ethnicity" can be seen as a negotiation of multiethnic relations in Harar, these relations are now further complicated by both the demand the new Ethiopian state places upon groups to identify themselves in definable ethnic terms and the need expressed by Hararis in the Diaspora to have a consistent, stable identity to which they can refer. Throughout this current political and economic restructuring, the Harari population has not remained static-some Hararis have repatriated since 1991, and others have emigrated abroad despite the relief of some of the more acute circumstances that forced their relatives to flee during the Dergue regime. The contemporary determination of Harari ethnicity is thus taking place in the midst of considerable population movement, movement which is, for the first time in history, transnational.

Religious Identity in the Diaspora

For Hararis in the Diaspora, adopting a transnational identity is a means of developing a consistent point of reference that can transcend both the culturally specific requirements of the multiple environments they now inhabit and the upheaval endured through their journeys between Ethiopia and Canada.

The impossibility of disassociating particular Ethiopian ethnic identities from particular religious traditions becomes broadly evident in the Diaspora. Membership in the Ethiopian Association of Toronto is thus almost exclusively Amhara, and this community's efforts have largely revolved around the celebration of Ethiopian Orthodox traditions and the establishment of an independent Ethiopian Orthodox Church. Similarly, the Ethiopian Federation of America, whose implicit understanding of Ethiopianness is Christian Amhara, speaks of an Ethiopian culture that largely fails to acknowledge the presence of the more than 60% of the population in Ethiopia who are Muslim.[26]

Sorenson, who conducted a study of Ethiopian/Eritrean voluntary organizations in Canada at the end of the Dergue era, concludes that the formation of different voluntary groups in Canada largely

mirrors the existing ethnically based political factionalization in Ethiopia ("Politics"). The formation of voluntary groups along ethnic lines is perhaps the most obvious way of looking at diversity within the Ethiopian community, but as a methodological tool it risks homogenizing groups in much the same way Ethiopians are homogenized on the basis of "national origin" by the Canadian government. Focusing on the study of community organizations, which are largely politicized in the way that Sorenson suggests, nevertheless entails the danger of taking for granted "ethnicity" as the critical basis for self and community identification, and of assuming common experiences for and orientation of members of particular groups.[27] In my observations, gendered and generational identities appear to interact with and produce diverse perspectives on ethnic and religious identity within the Harari Diaspora.

Hararis and Other Muslims in Canada

Shaheen Azmi, in a study of Muslims and provision of social services in Toronto, states that, regardless of ethnicity, Muslims in Canada assert their religion rather than their ethnicity as their primary identity (153). A multiculturalism policy that defines diasporic communities on the basis of "nationalisms" or citizenship rather than of subnationalisms, ethnicities, or religious orientations risks failing to understand critical aspects of immigrant and settlement experience, including the ways in which associations between groups are established in Canada and the bases upon which individuals are simultaneously integrated and discriminated against. In asserting their identity as Muslims rather than as Africans,[28] Ethiopians, or Hararis, Hararis actively construct a frame of reference for their relationships within and to the dominant society,[29] with other resident minority groups, with their homeland, and with each other.

Developing a Muslim identity that is transnational allows Hararis to communicate widely through the medium of a shared religious tradition. What is shared with other Muslims in the Canadian context is that which is *sunna*, or obligatory within Islam. As a result, what appears to be happening is a homogenization or essentialization of Islamic practices, where culturally specific aspects of Islam that are not shared with other Muslim populations are likely to disappear, since they are not reinforced by Muslims from other groups in this context.

Muslim space is shared as Muslims from all different backgrounds pray together at mosques. Hararis do not attend specific mosques-they attend one of the more than fourteen mosques in Toronto that is close to where they live or work[30] and pray alongside Muslims from around the world. This doesn't seem to concern

Hararis, who believe that Islam does not distinguish between people on the basis of skin color, ethnicity, or nationality; Muslims are one and the same, and there is thus no drive or perceived need to establish a separate mosque for Hararis.[31] Major Muslim celebrations such as 'Arafa and 'ld el Fitr, which are celebrated at the mosque, consequently also become standardized as the shared aspects of these traditions are reinforced, while culturally specific themes are reconceived as un-Islamic and dismissed. Many traditions that are enacted in Harar and thought of in terms of Islam are either not enacted here, or considered to be cultural embellishments of Muslim traditions that are unorthodox or even antithetical to the true spirit of Islam.

The community, then, sees it as critically important to teach Sunni Islam to children born here-the first to be born outside Ethiopia. Members ensure that children attend Qur'anic school, where they are taught Qur'an, hadi:th,32 and Arabic. The community has organized its own school, or Qur'an Ge, where once a week Harari volunteers teach about forty children at Teasedale Community Centre, a local community center in the Toronto suburb of Scarborough. The overwhelming majority (perhaps 95%) of the children at the Teasedale Qur'an Ge are Harari, but Somali, Sudanese, and Pakistani children from the neighborhood also attend and receive instruction in English and Arabic.

Nothing of what Harari children learn at the Teasedale Qur'an Ge specifically concerns Harar. They do not learn, for instance, about the saints of the city. While many aspects of Harari life have been recreated in the Diaspora-from traditional forms of social organization to the decoration and gendered division of domestic space-saints' shrines have not been reconstructed, and associated beliefs and practices have been largely discontinued. While aspects of culture *('ada)* are thought to be specific and benign, Islamic practices concern a wider community of believers, or the *umma*, who seek to regulate and standardize beliefs and practices. In strict Sunni practice, the worship of saints is considered tantamount to heresy. As many Harari youth tell me, "the saints are not Islam," since no one can intercede on behalf of Allah, intercession being one of the greatest possible sins in Islam. Some members of their parents' generation,

who would earlier have conceived of the saints of Harar within an Islamic framework, have, in response to the questions I have raised about this, explained that "some things just become *'ada* here."

Local history in Harar connects the actions of saints with the foundation of the city and with pivotal events in its development. - Knowledge, or a particular way of knowing the history of the city, is thus lost with the rejection of the saints,[33] and ways of recounting the history of the city and its people have to be dramatically altered in the absence of this knowledge. No alternative formal means of communicating Harari history has been developed, however, and in the absence of a literate tradition from which to draw, knowledge of the city's history is becoming remote. As Hararis tend to identify first and foremost as Muslims in the Canadian context, specific historical knowledge about the city becomes less relevant than the history of Islam with which most Harari children are taught to be familiar. If Hararis are simply Muslims, the relevance and meaning of the term Harari appears to be unclear to some younger members of the community. In a recent posting entitled "Who Am I?" that was sent to the Harari e-mail distribution list, an eighteen-year-old Harari man in Texas wrote: "I've just got one brief question: What makes a Harari .... HARARI??"

While specific traditions associated with saints are not practiced here, some effort is made by older women of the community to preserve aspects of some of the major Muslim festivals of Harar that are not celebrated by other Muslims. The Harari Women's Association holds events in the community center for Shawwiil 'ld [34] and *'Ashura,'* for instance, in order to teach the children something of Harari culture by providing special foods and singing traditional songs. Many of the women say that privately they do honor some of the older traditions, such as saying private *du'a'* (religious blessings) and burning incense for particular saints. These are small affairs, though, privately enacted by individual women in individual homes.

Men tend to have more contact with formal religious structures and other Muslims in Canada than older women, since they attend mosques with greater frequency and work outside the home. For many men, "becoming more Muslim" has also provided some alleviation of their experience of relative powerlessness here. Men who are skilled and well educated often experience what they consider to be discrimination and underemployment. Islam may well offer both a structure within which they can find meaning and purpose in their lives, and certain rights and privileges in private life that they do not have in public life. Some young women in Canada have chosen to adopt the *hijab*, or more "orthodox" veil, which they would not have worn in Harar. This is seen as similarly empowering, in that it allows them to project the importance of their identity as Muslims and enables them to honor Islamic morality while moving in non-sex-segregated and non-Muslim spaces.[35]

Among the first generation of children to be born in Canada, however, Harar, a place most have never visited, has become so remote that they simply do not take a lot of active interest in the traditions of the city. Among those who were not born in Canada, but have spent a significant part of their childhood and/or adolescence there, there is some sense of having "lost" a connection to their culture. While all identify themselves as Muslim first, many Harari teenagers seem quite critical about certain Islamic practices where these appear to be contradictory to legal constraints and social concerns in Canadian society with which they, as younger members of the community, primarily socialized in Canada, are most familiar.

When I showed some photographs to a family recently, for instance, generational differences in perception were readily apparent. One photograph I showed to a man, his wife, and their three teenage children depicted students at the traditional Islamic school in Harar. I pointed out the whip the teacher carries, and the teenagers reacted very strongly, commenting, "If he uses it, that's child abuse. If he used it

on me, I'd dial 911. That's just wrong." Their parents, however, objected, insisting that it was just "good discipline." Younger members of the community have been educated in a climate where physical punishment of any kind is prohibited in schools. The language of child abuse, learned in the Canadian context, appears to conflict with parental attitudes toward disciplining children.

Many teenagers feel much the same way about the practice, condoned by the Qur'an, of resorting to physical admonishment of one's wife when all other avenues for "punishment" have failed. The practice has also become a contested issue between many men and women in the Diaspora, where women are becoming aware of wife assault as a socio-legal concern in Canada. Some men in the community explain that what they call Islam is being called wife assault here, and say that some women use the option of calling 911 as a threat against their husbands. Marriages can break up for this reason, which Hararis say never would have happened at home. In Harar, the presence of extended families and crowded living conditions allow for informal familial "policing" of such practices and can check the severity of punishment administered to wives. In the high-rise buildings in which the majority of Toronto Hararis live, couples are more isolated, and such "community policing" can not take place.

Marriage practices are another area debated by teenagers. Polygamy is outlawed in Canada, and teenagers raised here are often versed in the language of sexual equality, which they apply in condemning this form of marriage. One young man, for instance, said he found the idea of having more than one wife "ridiculous." "Why can't a woman have multiple husbands then?" he asked. His mother, who overheard this comment, said that a woman could not have multiple husbands because she would never know the father of the children. Her daughter then objected, "of course she would, she would know, and if she didn't they could always do a paternity test." In the Canadian context, the differences between genders and generations are being expressed in terms of technology-911 and paternity tests.

Differences between the generations are undoubtedly exacerbated in Canada because the younger generation moves with greater ease in Canadian society. They are generally more proficient in English than their parents, and they sometimes act as translators when their parents have to deal with Canadian institutions. They have gone to school and spent more of their formative years in Canada, they have non-Harari friends (as their parents are less likely to), and they are more familiar with technology.

Even those teenagers who are not particularly religious, though, still insist on the importance of marrying Muslims. This is an endogamous community-one that generally marries within the group--but in Canada, with fewer young women than men, marriages are sometimes arranged with girls in Harar (Gibb, "Baraka"), and occasionally young Harari men marry outside the group. Still, there is considerable pressure to marry within the community or, at least, to marry another Muslim. Exogamy threatens to erode the already small and dispersed community, but most importantly, perhaps, adds to Hararis' fear of losing their identity as Muslims, usually expressed as the fear of raising children who are "confused" by conflicting religious messages.

Conclusion

Not only are attachment and connection expressed through religion, but conflict between members of the community in the Diaspora and between the Diaspora and the homeland is also articulated through debates surrounding religious practices. Many Hararis in Canada dismiss practices considered Islamic in Harar as either cultural practices or misunderstandings of the true spirit of Islam. This "purification" of religious practices is, I argue here, directly related to the experience of forced migration and settlement in a non-Islamic nation. Islam serves as a vehicle through which to reinforce community identity in the face of loss of particular cultural traditions and specific historic knowledge.

Muslim identity is reinforced in Canada through the presence of mosques, charitable organizations, religious schools, and other Muslims, while there are no specific points of reference in the Canadian landscape that reflect Harari identity and experience. As a fairly newly resident community, it is only recently that Hararis have established a broad cross section of the population, including a number of generations. While larger and longer-established communities, such as the Amhara, may have had an impact upon the physical landscape, establishing a church, several restaurants, food and clothing stores, and a recognizable community organization with office space on a major Toronto street, these landmarks, rather than attracting Hararis, reinforce their historic opposition to the ruling Christians.

Classifying Hararis on the basis of national origin as Ethiopians reveals nothing about the actual relationships Hararis form on the ground, where shared religion is key, while shared national origin is a reminder of historical opposition and persecution. In the multicultural landscape of Canada, then, historic antagonisms and hierarchical relationships are reinforced by government policy, while Islam offers a means through which Hararis can establish themselves within a larger, supportive community of Muslim Canadians.

Notes

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2. From the Arabic word for tribe.

3. These groups were identified in 1994 for the first census of the post-Mengistu era and were defined largely on the basis of language.

4. *Dergue* is Amharic for "council" and refers to the Provisional Military Council that was established after the overthrow of Imperial rule in 1974.

5. The Transitional Government of Ethiopia (1991-1995) originally proposed thirteen regions on the basis of the ethnic majorities in various parts of the country. Four of the smaller southern states subsequently merged to form the Southern People's Region. Two of the remaining regions are city-states given over to particular ethnic authorities: Addis Ababa, as the Imperial Capital established by King Menelik, is now an Amhara enclave in the Oromo Region, and Harar and its environs have been delineated as the Harari Region.

6. For details of the atrocities committed under the military dictatorship see de Waal.

7. For example, the Oromo, the largest single ethnic group in the country; the Eritreans; and the Tigrayans, another highland Christian elite with strong historical claims to regional dominance, who currently form the basis of the new Ethiopian government.

8. In 1995, the largest state trials since Nuremberg began, bringing former Dergue officials to trial for their involvement in the atrocities committed under that regime.

9. Receiving countries similarly identify Kurds from Turkey as Turks, Armenians fleeing Iraq as Iraqis, and Oromo, Amhara, Somalis, and Hararis from Ethiopia as Ethiopians. In this way, receiving countries inadvertently collude with states that deny recognition to subnational groups seeking to establish autonomy.

10. For details of this history see Caulk, "Harar," "Occupation," "Religion"; Hassen, "Oromo," "Menelik"; Pankhurst; and Zewde, among others.

11. Bahru Zewde notes that this association lacks a scientific basis (7).

12. In Canada's 1991 census, 11,060 people identified Ethiopia as their place of birth. It is unclear what source the Catholic Immigration Centre used to arrive at this figure of 15,000, but in my opinion it is a reasonable minimum estimate. The Ethiopian Association of Toronto estimates the number to be closer to 20,000.

13. While I have observed this in the late 1990s, Sorenson noted that it was already the case in the early 1990s.

14. Undoubtedly there have also been significant changes in Ethiopian Christian experience and identity. This, however, is not the focus of my research or the discussion presented here.

15. 42,000-45,000 Hararis live worldwide, according to the estimates given to me by Harari statisticians of the Ethiopian Central Statistical Authority in 1994.

16. See Sorenson, "Essence," for a discussion of the Eritrean case.

17. In the limited research on Ethiopians in the Diaspora, the Harari are portrayed as a relatively exclusive and inaccessible population and have not been the subject of formal study. As an anthropologist whose doctoral work was based in Harar, Sidney Waldron has been able to make contact and offer some comment on early Hararis in the Diaspora ("Within"). John Sorenson has conducted research on multiple identities of Ethiopians in Canada but makes no particular mention of Hararis ("Politics," "Essence"). Helene Moussa, 'in her study of Ethiopian and Eritrean women's refugee and immigrant experiences, states that she was unable to make any significant contact with the Harari community (38).

18. In the initial instance, the Latin alphabet was adopted and a year's worth of textbooks using the new alphabet produced. Latin was chosen over Amharic and Arabic, despite its inadequacy for transliterating a Semitic language, because it is globally recognized, it represented political neutrality, and it was compatible with the government's existing computer software. An alphabet using the Latin script had likewise been developed for the Oromo language. However, the difficulties Hararis had with this less than adequate solution, the fact that many elders were not at all familiar with the Latin script, and the increasing local pressure to establish a distinct presence from neighboring Oromo led a year later to the decision to drop the Latin script in favor of the Amharic script. The initial arguments against using the Amharic script had been political; Amharic had been forced upon the Hararis in the nationalist and educational campaigns initiated under Haile Selassie's rule, and the script was representative of the oppression of preceding decades. There was no question, though, that as the script of a Semitic language it

was more naturally suited to the transliteration of the Harari language. It was, furthermore, familiar to all but the very oldest sections of the population and thus demanded the least re-education.

19. This has led some scholars to propose a two-tiered existence of a Great Tradition of orthodoxy and a Little Tradition of associated practices that are assumed to be subordinate, marginalized, or peripheral (i.e., Gellner; see Tapper and Tapper for a critique of this theory). In fact, local experience may be lived out primarily through these "marginal" practices, bringing into question this division and the values assigned within it.

20. As, for example, in Qur'an 10:62 (Ali).

21. For example, Qur'an 2:257;4:45 (Ali).

22. I have not come across a comparable body of female saints elsewhere in the historic and ethnographic writings on the Muslim world.

23. *Chat*, known more commonly in East Africa and Arabia as *qat*, is often used in religious worship in Harar. As a stimulant, it appears to aid concentration and help sustain the energy required for continuous hours of recitation.

24. The Amhara, who are numerically much greater than the Harari in the region, are the only one of the major "nationalities" who do not have their own local saints in the area. It is not simply that they are Christians; in fact, being Christian does not, as I have witnessed, prevent or prohibit some Amhara from worshipping at Muslim shrines in the city. It is that as invaders and as relative newcomers they do not share the historical experiences of living in the city, nor do they find their ancestry therein.

25. Local understanding is, of course, not uniformly experienced but varies on the basis of such factors as gender, class, ethnicity, and place of residence. What is common, though, is that Muslim residents of the city, regardless of these factors, honor the saints.

26. This is roughly the first "democratic" census's estimate (1994) of the percentage of the country that is Muslim. Previous regimes had systematically underestimated the number of Muslims in the country (see Kinfe 155).

27. Both Sorenson (314) and Moussa (213) observe that Ethiopian and Eritrean voluntary organizations in Canada do not generally reflect women's experiences, with the result that their participation within such organizations is proportionately low. While this is not, in my observations, the case for Harari women - that is, Harari women are actively involved in both the leadership and the constituency of the Harari Community Organization of Ontario - this observation does point to the importance of considering how gender shapes participation and experience.

28. This seems to be less true in the United States, where many Ethiopian youth identify themselves with the Black American community. Within the latter, some reify Ethiopia as a symbol of African strength against foreign domination.

29. If such a single entity can be said to exist in the way that bureaucracy tends to suggest.

30. In the early stages of the community's development here, most Hararis lived in the same area and consequently attended the same mosque. With time, adaptation, and economic mobility, the community is dispersed, and people do not necessarily attend the same mosque.

31. With few elders from the homeland community in Canada, and with English necessary to those who serve as Muslim religious leaders there, none of the imams or Muslim judges in Toronto are Harari. Weddings between Hararis in Toronto are presided over by non-Harari Muslim judges.

32. This word, meaning "tradition," refers to records of the words and deeds of the Prophet Mohammed, held up as examples to be emulated by Muslims. Along with the Qur'an, the *hadith* serve as the basis for Islamic jurisprudence.

33. I have found myself in the curious position of telling stories of the saints and their miracles to young children in English. Since the saints are not mentioned in Qur'anic school, the children have real difficulty even conceptualizing their existence, let alone seeing their relevance to the history of the city.

34. Shawwal 'Id is the celebration that marks the end of an additional week of fasting immediately following the end of Ramadan; it appears to be unique to Hararis.

35. This is a sentiment commonly expressed by Muslim women in non-Muslim societies.

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